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In the standard real options approach to investment under uncertainty, agents formulate
optimal policies under the assumptions of risk neutrality or perfect capital markets. However,
in most situations, corporate executives face incomplete markets either because they receive
compensation packages that restrict their portfolios or because cash ﬂows from the ﬁrm’s
investment opportunities are not spanned by those of existing assets. The present paper
examines the impact of managerial risk aversion on investment decisions when the manager is
exposed to idiosyncratic risk and faces the risk of a control challenge. In the paper, the
investment policy selected by the manager reﬂects a trade-off between his incentives to reduce
risk and the need to ensure sufﬁcient efﬁciency to prevent control challenges. The analysis
demonstrates that risk aversion induces the manager to speed up investment, leading to a
signiﬁcant erosion of the value of the option to wait.
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Since the seminal contributions of Brennan and Schwartz (1985) and McDonald
and Siegel (1986), the literature analyzing investment decisions using the real option
approach has developed substantially.1 One of the most cited result in this literature
is that, with uncertainty and irreversibility, there exists a signiﬁcant option value of
waiting to invest. As a consequence, ﬁrms should only invest when the asset value
exceeds the investment cost by a potentially large option premium. However, the
assumptions of risk-neutrality or perfect capital markets on which this result relies
are not particularly relevant to most real-world environments. While large
shareholders may be able to perfectly diversify their wealth, corporate executives
are typically exposed to idiosyncratic risk.2 As a result, their policy choices should
reﬂect their attitude towards risk.
In this paper, we show how managerial risk aversion can affect investment policy
and ﬁrm value when managers face incomplete markets. To make the intuition as
clear as possible, we use a simple generalization of the standard McDonald and
Siegel (1986) framework in which the manager is exposed to idiosyncractic risk and
cannot undo this exposure by trading in the ﬁrm’s assets. In that model, the ﬁrm has
perpetual rights to a project and seeks to determine the investment date that
maximizes the value of the project. In addition, ‘‘risk aversion by investors is
introduced [. . .] by supposing that options to invest are owned by well-diversiﬁed
investors, who need only be compensated for the systematic component of the risk of
projects and options to invest.’ Within the present paper, the decision maker faces
incomplete markets and cannot eliminate idiosyncratic risk. Therefore, he requires
compensation for both idiosyncratic and systematic risks.
The derivation of the results in the paper proceeds in two steps. The ﬁrst step
solves the portfolio policy of the manager and derives his indirect utility of wealth.
The second step examines the impact of risk aversion and market incompleteness on
investment decisions. To get conservative estimates of the distortions implied by
managerial risk aversion, we allow the manager to reduce his risk exposure in two
ways. First, the manager can invest in the market portfolio and a risk-free asset.
Second, he can select the timing of investment, thereby affecting ﬁrm risk. In
addition, we presume that when the policy choices of the manager erode ﬁrm value,
the manager can face the threat of a control challenge and incur a cost that increases
with deviations from value-maximization in investment policy.
The analysis in the paper reveals that when the manager has control rights over
investment policy, his investment decisions reﬂect a trade-off between his incentives
to invest early to reduce idiosyncratic risk and the need to ensure sufﬁcient efﬁciency
to prevent costly control transactions. The paper also demonstrates that managerial1Dixit and Pindyck (1994) survey early real options models. Recent developments include the impact of
competition (see Grenadier, 2002), ﬁnancial leverage (Hennessy, 2004), learning (Descamps et al., 2004),
liquidity (Mello and Parsons, 2000), macroeconomic conditions (Guo et al., 2005), and agency (Grenadier
and Wang, 2005).
2Exposure to idiosyncratic risk may arise because the cash ﬂows from the ﬁrm’s projects are not spanned
by those of existing assets, because of transaction costs, or because of compensation packages.
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Speciﬁcally, the difference in net present values under ﬁrm- and utility-maximizing
policies can reach 50% for reasonable parameter values. As shown in the paper, this
reduction in NPVs arises because the manager has a strong incentive to invest early
in the project, as manifested by his decision to select an investment threshold
(minimum NPV) that is too low relative to the value-maximizing threshold. In
particular, exposure to idiosyncratic risk quickly erodes the value of the option to
wait and leads to investment near the zero NPV threshold.
The analysis in the present paper relates to two distinct strands of literature. First,
from a modeling perspective, our analysis relates to the papers of Henderson (2005)
and Miao and Wang (2005), in which the authors examine the impact of market
incompleteness on investment decisions under uncertainty. In these papers, there are
no agency conﬂicts between the decision maker and the owner of the project. In
addition, the decision maker is characterized by an exponential utility function that
precludes wealth effects. Importantly, while the analysis in Henderson is similar to
ours, Miao and Wang introduce interesting differences by allowing the project owner
to optimize his consumption stream and to hedge (partly) idiosyncratic shocks.
Second, from an economic perspective, the paper relates to the growing literature
that analyzes the implications of imperfect corporate governance for ﬁrms’ policy
choices (see e.g. Stulz, 1990, or Zwiebel, 1996). So far, theoretical work in this area
has largely been qualitative, focusing only on directional effects (see however
Morellec, 2004). Moreover, this literature has been mostly concerned with the size of
investment, i.e. how much to invest, rather than with its timing, i.e. when to invest.
The present paper encompasses elements of both literatures in a uniﬁed framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 derives the relation between risk aversion and investment timing. Section 4
discusses implications. Section 5 concludes.
2. Model and assumptions
This paper analyzes the impact of managerial risk aversion on the ﬁrm’s
investment decisions when the manager has decision rights over investment policy
and faces incomplete markets. For doing so, we consider an inﬁnite horizon model of
a continuous time economy where uncertainty is represented by a ﬁltered probability
space ðO;F;F;PÞ on which are deﬁned two independent standard Brownian motions
Z and ZM . The ﬁltration F:¼ðFtÞtX0 representing the information ﬂow in this
economy is the usual augmentation of the ﬁltration generated by the Brownian
motions.
2.1. Investment opportunity set
There are three assets available for continuous trading by unconstrained investors.
The ﬁrst security is a risk free bond with price process B satisfying
dBt ¼ rBt dt; B0 ¼ 1, (1)
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risky asset is a market index. We denote its price process by M and assume that
dMt ¼ mMMt dtþ sMMt dZMt ; M040, (2)
where mM is the constant expected rate of return on the market portfolio, sM40 is
the constant volatility of market returns and ZM represents market risk.
The second risky asset represents the stock of a ﬁrm in the market portfolio. We
denote its price process by P and assume that its dynamics are given by
dPt ¼ ðrþ xyÞPt dtþ xPt dZMt þ zPt dZt; P040, (3)
for some constants x and za0 where y ¼ s1M ½mM  r is the market price of risk. The
role of this second risky asset is to ensure that the securities available to
unconstrained investors span both the market risk factor ZM and the idiosyncratic
risk factor Z.
2.2. Preferences and trading strategies
The economy is populated with two types of agents: shareholders and the ﬁrm’s
manager. Shareholders are unconstrained and have access to the complete ﬁnancial
market described above. As a result, the preferences of these agents are irrelevant
since they can perfectly hedge any risk by a controlled portfolio of the traded
securities. By contrast, the manager is only allowed to trade in the bond and the
market portfolio and thus faces incomplete markets since he cannot hedge against
the variations of the idiosyncratic risk factor. We assume throughout the paper that
the preferences of the manager are represented by the functional
ðT ;X Þ7!E½erTUðX Þ ¼ E e
rTX 1R
1 R
 
, (4)
for wealth X available at time T. In this speciﬁcation, the constant R 2 ð0; 1Þ is the
manager’s relative risk aversion and r40 represents his subjective discount rate.3
We assume that the manager is endowed with an initial capital x40 and denote by
p the proportion of his wealth that the manager invests in the market portfolio.
Under the usual self-ﬁnancing and integrability conditions (see Dufﬁe, 2003), the
proportion 1 p of the manager’s wealth is invested in the risk-free security and the
dynamics of the manager’s wealth are given by
dXt
Xt
¼ ð1 ptÞrdtþ pt
dMt
Mt
; X 0 ¼ x. (5)
Given the fact that our horizon is potentially inﬁnite, we deﬁne the set of admissible
trading strategies for the manager as
A:¼fp : X tX0 for all t 2Tg, (6)3Similar results obtain when R41. However, the restrictions imposed on the parameter values have to
be modiﬁed and the proof of our main result is much more involved.
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immediate to show that the discounted wealth process of an admissible strategy is a
supermartingale under any risk-neutral probability measure, so that the set A is
arbitrage-free.
2.3. Investment policy and firm value
We consider a setting in which shareholders delegate investment decisions to the
manager, taking advantage of his skills (see also Grenadier and Wang, 2005). To
keep the analysis as simple as possible, we assume that the ﬁrm’s only asset is an
option to invest the amount I in a project paying a dividend dA per unit of time for D
years. In this speciﬁcation d is a strictly positive constant representing the rate at
which dividends are paid and A is the non-negative process deﬁned by
dAt ¼ mAAt dtþ bsMAt dZMt þ kAt dZt; A0 ¼ a40, (7)
for some constants b and k40. In this equation, the constant k represents the
residual variance of assets returns and Z represents idiosyncratic risk. This Brownian
motion is independent of the market risk factor ZM so that the covariance
between the market index and the value of the ﬁrm’s assets is fully captured by the
parameter b.
We show below that it is optimal for the manager to consider investment policies
under which the investment time t is the ﬁrst passage time of the underlying asset
value process A above a constant trigger level a. In this case, the initial value of the
ﬁrm to shareholders is given by
SðaÞ ¼ ðaf IÞ a
a
 Y0
, (8)
for all apa where we have set
f:¼ d
rþ bsMy mA
½1 eðrþbsMymAÞD, (9)
and
Y0:¼
1
2
 mA  bsMy
k2 þ b2s2M
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1
2
 mA  bsMy
k2 þ b2s2M
 !2
þ 2r
k2 þ b2s2M
vuut 41. (10)
If shareholders had control rights over the ﬁrm’s investment decisions, they would
choose the investment policy that maximizes the initial value SðaÞ of the ﬁrm. The
corresponding investment policy consists in investing as soon as the value of the
underlying assets exceeds the value maximizing threshold a0 deﬁned by
a0:¼
Y0
Y0  1
f1I . (11)
In our setting, shareholders delegate the investment decision to a manager. As a
result, the ﬁrm’s investment policy will reﬂect both the preferences of the manager
ARTICLE IN PRESS
J. Hugonnier, E. Morellec / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 1781–18001786towards risk and the impact of the market for corporate control on the policy
choices of the manager. The next section describes this trade-off in greater detail.
2.4. Agency costs and the market for corporate control
We follow Zwiebel (1996) and Morellec (2004) by making the following two
assumptions. First, we presume that the manager has control rights over investment
policy. While in their settings this allocation of control rights implies that the
manager chooses how much to invest, in our model it implies instead that the
manager chooses when to invest. Second, we consider that the manager is
constrained by the market for corporate control when making investment decisions.
Notably, policies that imply deviations from value maximization expose the manager
to the risk of a control transaction at the time of investment. We denote the
probability of a costly control challenge by pðaÞ where a denotes the value of the
underlying assets at the time of investment. This probability increases with
deviations from value maximization and is given by
pðaÞ:¼1 1fafXIg
SðaÞ
Sða0Þ
 g
, (12)
where g 2 ð0; 1Þ, a is the investment threshold selected by the manager, a0 is the value
maximizing investment threshold deﬁned in (11), and Sð:Þ is the value of the project
deﬁned in (8). In this speciﬁcation, the parameter g represents the cost for the manager
of deviating from value-maximization. Importantly, the probability of a control
challenge increases with agency costs, deﬁned as the reduction in the value of the project
associated with managerial discretion. In particular, pðaÞ ¼ 0 and there is no risk of a
control challenge if the manager implements the value maximizing investment policy.
The manager’s wealth at the time of investment depends on the selected
investment policy in the following way. If the manager is not replaced at the time
of investment, his wealth is scaled up by a factor b41. If, on the other hand, he is
replaced, then his wealth is scaled down by the non-negative factor
f ðaÞ:¼ c
af
I
 Z
if investment has a negative NPV; i.e. if afpI ;
c otherwise;
8><
>: (13)
where the parameter c 2 ð0; 1Þ represents the fraction of his wealth that the manager
retains upon being replaced and ZX1 is a cost parameter. This speciﬁcation shows
that if the manager is replaced, he incurs a negative shock to his wealth (for example
due to reputation). The reduction in wealth is more important if the manager has
invested in a negative NPV project and increases as the project’s NPV decreases.
This speciﬁcation also implies that at the time t of investment the manager’s incurs a
proportional shock to his wealth which is given by
Wt:¼f ðAtÞ þ 1Bt ½b f ðAtÞ, (14)
where Bt denotes the set of states of nature in which the manager is not replaced.
We now turn to the analysis of investment decisions.
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The manager’s objective is to maximize the discounted utility of his wealth by
selecting his portfolio strategy p as well as the ﬁrm’s investment time t. We can thus
write his indirect utility function as
uðx; aÞ:¼ sup
t2T
uðx; ajtÞ ¼ sup
t2T
sup
p2A
E½ertUðWtXpt Þ, (15)
where Xp is the wealth process associated with the admissible trading strategy p 2A
and W is the shock to manager’s wealth at the time of investment t (deﬁned in (14)).
Let Fa:¼ðFat Þ denote the usual augmentation of the ﬁltration generated by the
underlying asset value process. The manager’s dynamic budget constraint being
linear and his utility being homogenous of degree 1 R in wealth, we have that the
identity uðx; ajtÞ ¼ x1Ruð1; ajtÞ holds true for all initial levels of capital x40. As a
result, the value of the underlying asset is the only relevant state variable for the
optimal stopping problem and we may restrict ourselves to the setTa of Fa-stopping
times when computing the ﬁrst supremum in Eq. (15).
To facilitate the exposition of our results, we ﬁrst ﬁx some notation. Let ðl;F; qÞ be
the constants deﬁned by
l:¼ 1 R
R
 
y, ð16Þ
F:¼1þ 1 R
R
b2s2M
k2 þ b2s2M
 !
41, ð17Þ
q:¼F r ð1 RÞ rþ y
2
2R
  
, ð18Þ
and denote by Y1 the non-negative solution to the quadratic equation
ðmA þ bsMlÞYþ 12YðY 1Þðk2 þ b2s2MÞ  q ¼ 0. (19)
Furthermore, let P be the equivalent probability measure deﬁned by
dP
dP
				
Ft
:¼ exp lZMt 
1
2
l2t
 
, (20)
and denote the associated expectation operator by E. The following theorem
provides a complete solution to the manager’s portfolio choice problem given a ﬁxed
investment policy (i.e. given an arbitrary stopping time t 2Ta).
Theorem 1. Assume that the constant q is strictly positive and let t be an arbitrary
stopping time in the underlying assets’ filtration. Then, for any given investment policy
t, the manager’s discounted utility of wealth satisfies
uðx; ajtÞ ¼ UðxÞE½eqtWð1RÞFt 1=F. (21)
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portfolio choice problem, we can now turn to the determination of the utility-
maximizing investment policy. Using the result of Theorem 1 in conjunction with the
law of iterated expectations and the deﬁnition of Bt, we have that the manager’s
indirect utility function can be written as
uðx; aÞ ¼ UðxÞ sup
t2Ta
E½eqthðAtÞ

 1=F
, (22)
where the deterministic reward function h is deﬁned by
hðaÞ:¼E½Wð1RÞFt jAt ¼ a ¼ bð1RÞf þ pðaÞ½f ðaÞð1RÞF  bð1RÞF. (23)
This maximization problem is similar to traditional maximization problems in the
real options literature since the objective function is equal to the product of a reward
function and a stochastic discount factor. The main difference between our setting
and traditional models is that in our formulation markets are incomplete and the
manager is subject to the possibility of a control challenge. This results in
endogenous distortions of the reward function, the discount rate and the valuation
measure and implies that the investment threshold selected by the manager depends
on his degree of relative risk aversion.
The manager’s reward function h being strictly increasing on the interval ½0; a0
and strictly decreasing otherwise, it is natural to conjecture that the utility-
maximizing policy consists in investing as soon as the value of the underlying assets
reaches a critical level a 2 ½f1I ; a0. The following theorem makes this intuition
precise and provides an explicit characterization of the investment policy selected by
the manager.
Theorem 2. Assume that q is strictly positive, that Y1oZð1 RÞF, and that the
starting value of assets is below the investment threshold selected by the manager. Then,
the manager’s indirect utility function is given by
uðx; aÞ ¼ UðxÞE eqthðAt Þ
 1=F ¼ UðxÞ hðaÞ a
a
 Y1 1=F
, (24)
where the constant a is the unique solution in the interval ½f1I ; a0 to the non-linear
equation:
Y1 
ah0ðaÞ
hðaÞ ¼ 0 (25)
and the optimal investment time t is the first hitting time of the constant investment
threshold a by the value of the underlying assets.
Having obtained a complete description of the manager’s optimal investment
strategy, we now turn to the analysis of the impact of risk aversion, incomplete
markets and the market for corporate control on investment decisions. Since the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 1
Input parameter values
Parameter Value
Risk free rate r ¼ 0:03
Dividend yield d ¼ 0:03
Market volatility sM ¼ 0:3
Idiosyncratic volatility k ¼ 0:1
Sharpe ratio and beta y ¼ 0:3
Project beta bM ¼ 1
Risk aversion coefﬁcient R ¼ 0:5
Subjective discount factor r ¼ 0:15
Shocks to the wealth b ¼ 1:1 and c ¼ 0:5
Cost parameters g ¼ 0:5 and Z ¼ 3
Cost of investment I ¼ 1
This table reports the parameter values used in the base case environment. The subjective discount rate of
the manager satisﬁes the transversality condition r4ð1 RÞðrþ y2=2RÞ. In addition, the cost parameter Z
is such that Y1oZð1 RÞF and we set the drift of the underlying asset process equal to:
mA ¼ r dþ bsMy.
J. Hugonnier, E. Morellec / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 1781–1800 1789investment threshold is the solution to a non-linear equation that does not admit an
explicit solution, most of the results will be illustrated by numerical examples.4
4. Model implications
To determine the values of the quantities of interest, it is necessary to select
parameter values for the initial value of the ﬁrm’s assets A0, the cost of investment I,
the risk free interest rate r, the dividend yield d, the ﬁrm’s beta bM , the market
volatility sM , idiosyncratic volatility k, the subjective discount rate r, the Sharpe
ratio y, the cost parameter g, and the coefﬁcient of risk aversion R. Whenever
possible, we use the parameters values of Boyle and Guthrie (2003). Additional
parameter values for the base case environment are reported in Table 1.
The model developed above yields a number of novel implications regarding
investment decisions under uncertainty. These implications are grouped in two
categories as follows.
4.1. Risk aversion and the erosion of the option value to wait
One of the major contributions of the real options literature is to show that with
uncertainty and irreversibility, there exists a value of waiting to invest and the
decision maker should only invest when the asset value exceeds the investment cost4In Appendix C, we consider a reduced-form version of the model that generates closed-form solutions
for the investment threshold selected by the manager. The numerical results associated with this alternative
speciﬁcation are quantitatively very close and qualitatively identical to those presented below.
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Pindyck (1994):
We ﬁnd that [. . .] the option value [of waiting] is quantitatively very important.
Waiting remains optimal even though the expected rate of return on immediate
investment is substantially above the interest rate or the normal rate of return on
capital. Return multiples as much as two or three times the normal rate are
typically needed before the ﬁrm will exercise its option and make the investment.
Although this investment policy is consistent with what shareholders would want
the ﬁrm to do, it is not consistent with what managers will do when taking into
account risk aversion. Notably, Theorem 2 and the simulation results reported below
show that the risk-averse manager has an incentive to speed up investment in
comparison with the value-maximizing policy for well-diversiﬁed shareholders. To
better understand this incentive to invest early, one has to recall that within the
present model the wealth of the manager depends on the value of the asset
underlying the project. As a result, the manager is exposed to idiosyncratic risk. By
investing, the manager reduces his exposure idiosyncratic volatility, thereby
increasing his discounted utility of wealth. This provides the manager with an
additional beneﬁt to investment and thus with an incentive to select an investment
threshold (minimum NPV) that is too low relative to the value-maximizing
threshold. This incentive is only partially offset by the impact of the market for
corporate control on the policy choices of the manager, leading to early investment.
We can investigate the impact of risk aversion on the timing of investment by
analyzing the change in the selected investment threshold due to managerial risk
aversion. Fig. 1 plots the investment threshold selected by the ﬁrm if it were to follow
the zero-NPV rule (short dashed line), the investment rule that maximizes
shareholders’ wealth (long dashed line) or the decision rule that maximizes
managerial utility (solid line). In this ﬁgure, the investment threshold is represented
as a function of (i) market volatility sM , (ii) idiosyncratic volatility k, (iii) the risk
aversion coefﬁcient R, (iv) the subjective discount rate r, (v) the positive shock b, and
(vi) the cost of a control challenge g. For each simulation, we vary the value of one
parameter. The other parameter values are set as in the base case environment.
Consistent with economic intuition, the ﬁgure shows that risk aversion tends to
decrease the investment threshold selected by the manager, and hence to speed up
investment. One direct implication of this result is that risk aversion signiﬁcantly
erodes the value of waiting to invest. Simulation results also reveal that when risk-
averse managers have control rights over investment policy, the traditional NPV rule
becomes increasingly descriptive as risk aversion or the manager’s subjective
discount rate increase. In other words, conﬂicts of interests between shareholders
and the manager tend to mitigate some of the conclusions reached under perfect
contracting.
Fig. 1 also reveals that when risk aversion is at play, market volatility and
idiosyncratic volatility can have very different effects on the selected investment
policy. In particular, the ﬁgure reveals that the larger market (i.e. priced) volatility,
the larger the option value of waiting and the larger the selected investment
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Fig. 1. Investment thresholds. The ﬁgure plots the investment threshold selected by the ﬁrm if it were to
follow the zero-NPV rule (short dashed line), the investment rule that maximizes shareholders’ wealth
(long dashed line) or the decision rule that maximizes managerial utility (solid line). In this ﬁgure, the
investment threshold is represented as a function of (i) market volatility sM , (ii) idiosyncratic volatility k,
(iii) the risk aversion coefﬁcient R, (iv) the subjective discount rate r, (v) the positive shock b, and (vi) the
cost of a control challenge g. For each simulation, we vary the value of one parameter. The other
parameter values are set as in the base case environment.
J. Hugonnier, E. Morellec / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 1781–1800 1791threshold. By contrast, an increase of idiosyncratic volatility imposes more
(unpriced) risk on the manager so that idiosyncratic volatility has little or no
impact on the selected investment policy. The ﬁgure also shows that the market for
corporate control can have a large impact on the ﬁrm’s investment policy. Notably,
the investment threshold selected by the manager gets closer to the value-maximizing
one as the cost of a control challenge g increases.
The impact of managerial risk-aversion on investment policy can also be analyzed
by examining the change in the probability of investment due to risk aversion.
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P ¼N  lnðy=aÞ þmTﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðk2 þ b2s2MÞT
q
2
64
3
75þ y
a
 2m=ðk2þb2s2
M
Þ
N
 lnðy=aÞ mTﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðk2 þ b2s2MÞT
q
2
64
3
75, (26)
where m ¼ mA  ðk2 þ b2s2M Þ=2, N is the standard normal cumulative distribution
function, and y is the investment threshold.
In the base case environment, the probability of investment over a 10 year horizon
is 28% under the value-maximizing investment policy and 79% under the utility-
maximizing investment policy. Thus, managerial risk aversion favors investment and
has a signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood of investment. To get more insights on the
impact of the various parameters of the model, Fig. 2 plots the probability of
investment under the value-maximizing (dashed line) and utility-maximizing (solid
line) investment policies as a function of (i) market volatility sM , (ii) idiosyncratic
volatility k, (iii) the risk aversion coefﬁcient R, (iv) the subjective discount rate r, (v)
the positive shock b, and (vi) the cost of a control challenge g. For each simulation,
we vary the value of one parameter. The other parameter values are set as in the base
case environment. In this ﬁgure, a value of 0.4 for means that there is a 40%
probability of investment over the 10-year horizon.
Consider ﬁrst the impact of volatility. An increase in volatility (either through sM ,
k, or b) increases the variability of the return on investment and therefore the value
of waiting to invest for the manager. At the same time, an increase in volatility
increases the potential ﬂuctuations of the value process At, making it more likely that
any given threshold will be reached over a given horizon. Fig. 3 reveals that for well-
diversiﬁed shareholders (dashed line) the ﬁrst effect always typically dominates so
that the probability of investment decreases with volatility. As shown in Fig. 1, the
impact of volatility on the selected threshold for a risk-averse manager is not as
important as it is for a well-diversiﬁed shareholder. It can even be negative as far as
idiosyncratic volatility is concerned. The natural consequence of this effect is that an
increase in idiosyncratic volatility increases the likelihood of investment when
investment decisions are made by risk-averse managers. Finally, Fig. 3 shows that as
the beneﬁt of investing early increases (either because R increases or because r
increases), the likelihood of investment over a ﬁnite horizon increases. By contrast,
as the cost of investing early increases (because g increases), the likelihood of
investment over a ﬁnite horizon decreases.4.2. Agency costs and utility-maximization
The above analysis shows that a risk-averse manager has an incentive to speed up
investment in comparison with the value-maximizing policy for well-diversiﬁed
shareholders. As a result, managerial discretion induces agency costs that are equal
to the difference between current ﬁrm (option) values under ﬁrm- and utility-
maximizing policies. As a proportion of the value under the utility-maximizing
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Fig. 2. Probability of investment. The ﬁgure plots the probability of investment under the value-
maximizing (dashed line) and utility-maximizing (solid line) investment policies as a function of (i) market
volatility sM , (ii) idiosyncratic volatility k, (iii) the risk aversion coefﬁcient R, (iv) the subjective discount
rate r, (v) the positive shock b, and (vi) the cost of a control challenge g. For each simulation, we vary the
value of one parameter. The other parameter values are set as in the base case environment. In this ﬁgure,
a value of 0.4 for means that there is a 40% probability of investment over the 10-year horizon.
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SðaÞ
Sða0Þ
 1 ¼ fa
  I
fa0  I
a0
a
 Y0  1, (27)
where a is the investment threshold selected by the manager and a0 is the value-
maximizing investment threshold.
In the base case environment, agency costs amount to 55% of project’s NPV.
Thus, managerial risk aversion encourages investment and has a signiﬁcant impact
on the NPV of investment projects. To get more insights on the impact of the various
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Fig. 3. Agency costs. The ﬁgure plots agency costs as a function of (i) market volatility sM , (ii)
idiosyncratic volatility k, (iii) the risk aversion coefﬁcient R, (iv) the subjective discount rate r, (v) the
positive shock b, and (vi) the cost of a control challenge g. For each simulation, we vary the value of one
parameter. The other parameter values are set as in the base case environment. In this ﬁgure, a value of
40 for means that managerial discretion reduces the NPV of the option to invest by 40%.
J. Hugonnier, E. Morellec / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 1781–18001794parameters of the model, Fig. 3 plots agency costs as a function of (i) market
volatility sM , (ii) idiosyncratic volatility k, (iii) the risk aversion coefﬁcient R, (iv) the
subjective discount rate r, (v) the positive shock b, and (vi) the cost of a control
challenge g.
Fig. 3 conﬁrms the above intuition regarding agency costs. In particular, the
model predicts that agency costs should increase with idiosyncratic volatility, the
coefﬁcient of risk aversion, and the subjective discount rate of the investor, and
decrease with the cost g of a control challenge. Interestingly, agency costs decrease as
systematic (priced) risk increases. These results illustrate that in addition to
systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk is an important factor in the decision making
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idiosyncratic risk or the coefﬁcient of risk aversion.
Finally, and as a matter of completeness, Fig. 4 plots the expected utility of the
manager under the utility-maximizing investment policy (solid line) and the project
value-maximizing investment policy (dashed line).
This ﬁgure shows that there can be signiﬁcant costs to the manager of following
the value-maximizing investment policy. Again these costs increase with the risk
aversion coefﬁcient or idiosyncratic volatility and decrease with the probability of a
control challenge and the cost of a control challenge.Fig. 4. Indirect utility and the timing of investment. The ﬁgure plots the indirect utility of the manager as a
function of (i) market volatility sM , (ii) idiosyncratic volatility k, (iii) the risk aversion coefﬁcient R, (iv)
the subjective discount rate r, (v) the positive shock b, and (vi) the cost of a control challenge g. For each
simulation, we vary the value of one parameter. The other parameter values are set as in the base case
environment. The solid line represents indirect utility under the utility maximizing investment policy a.
The dashed line represents indirect utility under the project value maximizing investment policy a0.
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Since the seminal papers by Brennan and Schwartz (1985), and McDonald and
Siegel (1986), investment decisions under uncertainty have been the subject of
considerable research in ﬁnancial economics. In the vast majority of these models, it
is either assumed that agents are risk neutral or that markets are complete, so that
decisions are made in a preference-free environment. Yet, in most situations,
managers face incomplete markets either because the cash ﬂows from the ﬁrm’s
projects are not spanned by those of existing assets or because of compensations
packages that restrict their portfolios. In such circumstances, we can expect risk
aversion to play a role in investment decisions.
The present paper demonstrates that risk aversion provides an incentive for managers
to speed up investment. As shown in the paper, this incentive to invest early erodes the
value of waiting to invest, leading to investment near the zero NPV threshold. It also
signiﬁcantly increases the probability of investment over a given horizon. For example,
in the base case, the probability of investment over a 10-year horizon is 28% under the
value-maximizing investment policy and 79% under the utility-maximizing investment
policy. The analysis also shows that these distortions in investment policy induce large
agency costs, which can completely eliminate a project’s NPV.
While the present paper focuses on the impact of market incompleteness on
investment policy, similar results should obtain in other environment in which
corporate executives cannot eliminate their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. For
example, to the extent that the value of human capital is ﬁrm speciﬁc, managerial risk
aversion may have an impact on ﬁrm policy choices even if the ﬁrm does not have an
explicit compensation policy. Also, executives that have positions in non-traded
companies will typically ﬁnd it difﬁcult to eliminate their exposure to ﬁrm risk. In such
environments, one should expect risk aversion to speed up investment, the option
value of waiting to be small, and ﬁrms to invest close to the zero NPV threshold.
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Let t denote an arbitrary stopping time of the underlying assets ﬁltration and
consider the pair of non-negative, bounded processes deﬁned by
Ht:¼E½eqðttÞWð1RÞFt jFat 1=F ¼ ðeqtQtÞ1=F. (A.1)
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from well-known ﬁltering results that the underlying assets’ ﬁltration coincides with
the ﬁltration of the one-dimensional standard P-Brownian motion
Wt:¼ kZtﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2 þ b2s2M
q þ bsM ½ZMt  ltﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2 þ b2s2M
q . (A.2)
Thus, it follows from the martingale representation theorem that there exists an
almost surely square integrable process f such that
Qt ¼ E½eqtWð1RÞFt  þ
Z t
0
fs dWs. (A.3)
Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to the right-hand side of Eq. (A.1) and using the deﬁnition of
the process W we obtain that
dHt ¼ qHtF 
1 R
R
ctyþ
jctj2
2Ht

  
dtþ ct dZMt þ xt dZt, (A.4)
where the almost surely square integrable processes ðc; xÞ are deﬁned by
ðct; xtÞ:¼
bsMﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2 þ b2s2M
q ftHt
Qt
;
kﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
k2 þ b2s2M
q ftHt
Qt
0
B@
1
CA. (A.5)
Now let p 2A be an arbitrary admissible strategy for the manager and denote the
corresponding wealth process by Xp. Applying Itoˆ’s lemma to the non-negative
process
Ypt :¼ertUðX pt ÞHt, (A.6)
and using the homogeneity of the manager’s utility function in conjunction with Eqs.
(5) and (A.2), we obtain that
dYpt ¼ Ypt
1 R
R
y RptsM þ
ct
Ht
 2
dtþ cpt dZMt þ xpt dZt, (A.7)
holds for some almost surely square integrable processes ðcp; xpÞ. This implies that
the process Y p is a local supermartingale, and hence also a global supermartingale
since it is non-negative. The optional sampling theorem then implies that we have the
inequality E½Ypt pY p0 ¼ UðxÞH0, and it now follows from Eq. (A.1) and the
arbitrariness of the trading strategy that
uðx; ajtÞ ¼ sup
p2A
E½Y pt pY p0 ¼ UðxÞH0. (A.8)
Now consider the admissible trading strategy deﬁned by
pt :¼
y
sMR
þ c
sMHtR
. (A.9)
As is easily seen from Eq. (A.3), we have that the process Y :¼Yp is a local
martingale since its drift is equal to zero. Admitting for the moment that this process
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uðx; ajtÞXE½Y t  ¼ Y 0 ¼ UðxÞH0. (A.10)
This contradicts Eq. (A.4) and hence establishes the optimality of p as well as the
expression for the manager’s discounted utility of wealth given in the statement.
To complete the proof, we need to show that the process Y  is a uniformly
integrable martingale on the interval ½0; t. Since both q and F are strictly positive by
assumption, there exists a strictly positive constant oRð1 RÞ1 such that
p:¼ q
F
 ð1 RÞ
2
R Rð1þ Þð1 RÞ40. (A.11)
On the other hand, using the boundedness of the process W in conjunction with Eq.
(5), we obtain that there exists a strictly positive constant C and a non-negative local
martingale M such that
ðY t^zÞ1þpCðerðt^zÞUðX t^zÞÞ1þpCðepðt^zÞMt^zÞ, (A.12)
holds for all stopping times z 2T. The constant p being strictly positive by
construction, this implies that the non-negative local martingale Y  is uniformly
integrable on the stochastic interval ½0; t and our proof is complete.Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2
Straightforward computations using the deﬁnition of the function h and the
assumptions of the statement show that we have
sup
a2Rþ
faY1hðaÞg ¼ fðaÞY1hðaÞg, (B.1)
where the constant a is deﬁned as in the statement of the theorem. On the
other hand, applying Itoˆ’s lemma and using the deﬁnition of the constants q and Y1
shows that
Lt:¼eqtAY1t (B.2)
is a non-negative local martingale, and hence a supermartingale under the
probability measure P. Thus, using Eq. (B.1) in conjunction with the deﬁnition of
the manager’s indirect utility function we obtain that
uðx; aÞpUðxÞ ðaÞY1hðaÞ sup
t2Ta
E½Lt

 1=F
pUðxÞ hðaÞ a
a
 Y1 1=F
. (B.3)
Now let t denote the ﬁrst hitting time of the constant barrier a by the value of the
underlying assets. Using the continuity of the latter process in conjunction with the
fact that the initial value of the underlying assets is less that Ipfa0, we obtain
uðx; aÞXUðxÞ E eqthðAt Þ
  1=F ¼ UðxÞ hðaÞ a
a
 Y1 1=F
. (B.4)
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t as well as the expression for the value function given in the statement of the
theorem.Appendix C. A reduced-form model
In this appendix we provide an explicit solution to the model using a reduced-form
version of the speciﬁcation presented in the main text. Notably, we presume that the
proportional shock W incurred by the manager at the time of investment is larger
than one when the manager selects the value-maximizing policy and decreases with
deviations from value-maximization in investment policy. In particular, we assume
that
Wt ¼ WðAtÞ:¼L 1fapa0g
fa I
fa0  I
 g
þ 1fa4a0g
fa0  I
fa I
 g 
, (C.1)
where LX1, g 2 ð0; 1Þ is a cost parameter, t is the selected investment time, and a0 is
the investment threshold that maximizes project value. Although simple, this
speciﬁcation captures two essential aspects of agency relationships. In the model,
there is a beneﬁt to following the value maximizing investment policy and the larger
L the larger this beneﬁt. In addition, there is a cost to deviating from value-
maximization, and the larger g the larger this cost.
The following theorem provides a closed-form solution to the manager’s utility-
maximization problem under this speciﬁcation.
Theorem 3. Assume that q is strictly positive, that Y1oZð1 RÞF, and that the
starting value of the assets is below the investment threshold. Then the manager’s
indirect utility function is given by
uðx; aÞ ¼ UðxÞE½eqtWðAt Þð1RÞF1=F ¼ UðxÞWðaÞð1RÞ
a
a
 Y1=F
, (C.2)
where the optimal stopping time t is the first hitting time of the constant investment
threshold defined by
a:¼min a0;
Y1
Y1  gð1 RÞF
I
f

 
, (C.3)
for Y1  gð1 RÞF40 and a ¼ a0 otherwise.
This result shows explicitly that the trigger level selected by the manager is lower
than the value-maximizing threshold and that the manager invests early compared
with the value-maximizing investment policy. In addition, it demonstrates that the
threshold selected by the manager decreases with risk aversion. The numerical results
associated with this speciﬁcation are quantitatively very close and qualitatively
identical to those presented in the main text.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
J. Hugonnier, E. Morellec / Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 31 (2007) 1781–18001800References
Boyle, G., Guthrie, G., 2003. Investment, uncertainty, and liquidity. Journal of Finance 58, 2143–2166.
Brennan, M., Schwartz, E., 1985. Evaluating natural resource investments. Journal of Business 58,
137–157.
Descamps, J.-P., Mariotti, T., Villeneuve, S., 2004. Investment timing under incomplete information.
Mathematics of Operations Research 30, 472–500.
Dixit, A., Pindyck, R., 1994. Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Dufﬁe, D., 2003. Dynamic Asset Pricing Theory, third ed. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Grenadier, S., 2002. Option exercise games: an application to the equilibrium investment strategies of
ﬁrms. Review of Financial Studies 15, 691–721.
Grenadier, S., Wang, N., 2005. Incentives and investment timing: real options in a principal-agent setting.
Journal of Financial Economics 75, 493–533.
Guo, X., Miao, J., Morellec, E., 2005. Irreversible investment with regime shifts. Journal of Economic
Theory 122, 37–59.
Henderson, V., 2005. Valuing the option to invest in an incomplete market. Working Paper, Princeton
University.
Hennessy, C., 2004. Tobin’s Q, debt overhang, and investment. Journal of Finance 59, 1717–1742.
McDonald, R., Siegel, D., 1986. The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101,
707–728.
Mello, A., Parsons, J., 2000. Hedging and liquidity. Review of Financial Studies 13, 127–153.
Miao, J., Wang, N., 2005. Investment, consumption, and hedging under incomplete markets. Working
paper, Boston University.
Morellec, E., 2004. Can managerial discretion explain observed leverage ratios? Review of Financial
Studies 17, 257–294.
Stulz, R., 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal ﬁnancial policies. Journal of Financial Economics 26,
3–27.
Zwiebel, J., 1996. Dynamic capital structure under managerial entrenchment. American Economic Review
86, 1197–1215.
